Inter-parliamentary relations in the United Kingdom: devolution’s undiscovered country? by Evans, Adam
1 
 
Inter-parliamentary relations in the UK: devolution’s undiscovered 
country?1 
 
Adam Evans 
Wales Governance Centre, Cardiff University, Wales 
 
Summary 
Since 1997, the United Kingdom’s territorial constitution has undergone an immense process 
of change and has resulted in the establishment of separate legislatures and governments for 
the peoples of Scotland, Wales and, when Stormont is operational, Northern Ireland.  These 
changes have spawned a whole series of relationships between the institutions of the 
devolved UK, at executive, legislature and civil service levels. However, while 
intergovernmental relations has been the subject of repeated debate, there has been little 
attempt to document and examine the way in which the UK’s four legislatures interact with 
one another, post-devolution.  To the extent that these interactions, otherwise known as inter-
parliamentary relations (IPR), have been the subject of scrutiny it has been largely to bemoan 
their modest state and/or to suggest that stronger, albeit occasionally rather unelaborated, 
mechanisms be established. This article seeks to correct this deficit and provide a first step 
towards a clearer understanding of IPR in the UK, post-devolution. The article breaks the 
different levels of IPR down into three main strands: 1) parliament-parliament, 2) committee-
committee, and 3) official-official and suggests that the main interactions that take place at 
each of these levels. Following this audit, the article concludes by highlighting the role that 
shared policy competence (a field that is set to grow with the UK’s withdrawal from the 
European Union) has played in driving IPR in the UK, post-devolution and suggests some 
steps that may be taken to enhance IPR in the future. 
 
Introduction 
Since 1997, the UK’s territorial constitution has undergone an immense process of change. 
Where once the UK was confidently, but erroneously, described as a ‘Unitary state’ with a 
single legislature (with the notable exception of Northern Ireland from 1921-72) sharing a 
single, common legislature and government, devolution has resulted in the establishment of 
                                                          
1 The author would like to thank an anonymous reviewer as well as Professor Nicola McEwen, 
Professor Richard Wyn Jones and Dr Henry Midgley for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
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separate legislatures and governments for the peoples of Scotland, Wales and, when Stormont 
is operational, Northern Ireland.2  These changes have spawned a whole series of 
relationships between the institutions of the devolved UK: at intergovernmental, 
interparliamentary and inter/intra civil service3 levels. 
 
Intergovernmental relations (IGR), for example, have been the subject of repeated 
debate and criticism, both by official reports and by academics specialising in this field and 
there is now a sizeable literature that has developed in this area.4  However, to date, aside 
from occasional academic reports and references in the academic literature, little attempt has 
been made to document the way in which the UK’s four legislatures interact with one 
another, post-devolution.   
 
To the extent that these interactions, otherwise known as inter-parliamentary relations 
(IPR), have been the subject of scrutiny it has been largely to bemoan their modest state (the 
Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee in its 2017 report on inter-
institutional relations in the UK, for example, described IPR as ‘arguably the poorer and less 
well-developed relative of IGR’) and/or to suggest that stronger, albeit occasionally rather 
unelaborated, mechanisms be established.5  
                                                          
2 V. Bogdanor, The New British Constitution, (Oxford, 2009), pp.89-119; J. Mitchell, Devolution in 
the UK, (Manchester, 2009), pp.3-15 
3 While Northern Ireland has a distinct civil service, officials in the Scottish and Welsh Governments 
are technically part of the British Civil Service. 
4 See, for example: W. Swenden and N. McEwen, ‘UK devolution in the shadow of hierarchy? 
Intergovernmental relations and party politics’, Comparative European Politics 12 ( 4-5) (2014), 
pp.488-509; J. Gallagher, ‘Intergovernmental relations in the UK: Cooperation, competition and 
constitutional change’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 14 (2) (2012), pp.198–
213; J. Hunt and R. Minto, ‘Between intergovernmental relations and paradiplomacy: Wales and the 
Brexit of the regions’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 19(4) (2017), pp.647-
662; House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Inter-Governmental relations in the 
United Kingdom, 11th Report of Session 2014–2015 (2015), HL paper 146; Public Administration 
and Constitutional Affairs Committee, The Future of the Union, part two: Inter-institutional relations 
in the UK, Sixth Report of Session 2016-17 (2017), HC 839  
5 See, for example: L. McAllister, ‘Immature relationships in the new multi-level United Kingdom: 
perspectives from Wales’, Public Money & Management 35 (1) (2015), 31-38; S. Tierney, 
‘Federalism in a Unitary State: a Paradox too Far?’, Regional and Federal Studies 19 (2) (2009), 
pp.237-253; Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Inter-institutional relations 
in the UK, para. 79; Commission on Devolution in Scotland, Serving Scotland Better: Scotland and 
the United Kingdom in the 21st Century, Final Report, (June 2009), p.12; The Smith Commission, The 
Report of the Smith Commission for further devolution of powers to the Scottish Parliament, (27 
November 2014), p. 14; House of Commons Justice Committee, Devolution: a decade on, Fifth 
Report of Session 2008-09 (2009), HC 529-I, paras. 121-124; Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, A 
Constitutional Crossroads: Ways Forward for the United Kingdom, (2015), p.9  
3 
 
 
This article, drawn from the author’s experience working as an official in the House 
of Commons, seeks to enhance our understanding of IPR in the UK, post-devolution. 
Breaking the different levels of IPR down into three main strands: 1) parliament-parliament, 
2) committee-committee, and 3) official-official, this article provides an assessment of the 
current level of IPR in the UK and suggests that IPR activities can be seen as falling onto a 
spectrum ranging from formal IPR to more informal interactions. This article contends that 
many of the examples of IPR in the UK fall somewhere near the centre of this spectrum and 
can be classified as semi-formal IPR. This article concludes by highlighting the role that 
shared policy competence (a field that is set to grow with the UK’s withdrawal from the EU) 
has played in driving IPR in the UK, post-devolution. Finally, this article suggests some steps 
that may be taken to enhance IPR in the future. 
 
Perspectives on inter-parliamentary relations in the United Kingdom 
Inter-parliamentary relations represent one of the component parts of a broader network of 
inter-institutional relations within multi-level political systems. IPR’s cousin, 
intergovernmental relations (IGR) has generally attracted more attention and interest, with 
IPR, according to Winetrobe, ‘often regarded as some sort of minor sub-set’ of IGR – a state 
of affairs that may have arisen from the perception that ‘as governments generally dominate 
parliaments […], parliamentary relations can be subsumed in the wider idea of governmental 
relations’.6 
 
While IPR may complement and overlap with work undertaken at IGR level, it is 
nonetheless a distinct model of inter-institutional relations and one with a long lineage. As 
Bolleyer explains, IPR ‘can be bilateral, regional, national and inter-national’ in nature and 
can vary widely in the respective formality or informality of such exchanges.7 The reasons 
for undertaking IPR are also varied and can range from a desire for knowledge exchange to 
take place to a political imperative for parliaments to cooperate as a counterweight to 
executive-executive engagement at IGR level.  
 
                                                          
6 B. Winetrobe, ‘Inter-Parliamentary Relations in a Devolved UK: an Initial Overview’, in, House of 
Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Devolution: Inter-institutional relations in the United 
Kingdom, Second Report of Session 2002-03 (2002), HL Paper 28, p.60 
7 N. Bolleyer, ‘Why Legislatures Organise: Inter-Parliamentary Activism in Federal Systems and its 
Consequences’, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 16 (4) (2010), pp.411-437 
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In the UK, IPR has attracted relatively little attention in the academic literature. 
References are few and far between and can often feel like a bolt-on to more general 
discussions of IGR.8 Nonetheless, there does appear to be a strong sense, amongst those who 
have recently commented on this subject, that IPR is underdeveloped and should be 
enhanced.9 Such sentiments stand in contrast to Winetrobe’s assessment in 2002 that the early 
years of devolution had resulted witnessed an ‘organic and pragmatic development’ of IPR 
that had been ‘generally successful and productive’.10  
 
This therefore raises the question of what actually is the state of inter-parliamentary 
relations in the UK? Are they as underdeveloped and in need of reform as has been hinted by 
some of the academic literature and in the comments of parliamentary select committee 
reports or is IPR in the UK more developed and successful than is commonly appreciated. 
The next section of this article seeks to address this question and breaks down the different 
dimensions of IPR activity into different levels: 1) parliament-parliament, 2) committee-
committee and 3) official-official. As this article will demonstrate, IPR activity across these 
levels can be seen as falling across a formal-informal spectrum, with a considerable amount 
of IPR activity being semi-formal in nature. The diagram below outlines some examples of 
IPR activities and where they fall on this spectrum. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BIPA 
WAC-NAfW Joint Sessions  
Speakers-Presiding Officers Quadrilaterals 
UK-Ireland Clerks Network 
Secondments 
Ad-hoc meetings 
 
  
                                                          
8 House of Lords Constitution Committee, Inter-governmental relations in the United Kingdom, 11th 
Report of Session 2014-15 (2015), HL Paper 146; Tierney, ‘Federalism in a Unitary State’, p.250   
9 Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Inter-institutional relations in the UK, 
paras. 83-88. 
10 Winetrobe, ‘Inter-Parliamentary Relations in a Devolved UK’, pp.68-69 
Formal      Semi-formal     Informal 
Figure 1: Examples of the spectrum of IPR activity in the UK 
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The current state of inter-parliamentary relations in the United Kingdom 
 
Parliament-parliament level 
 
British-Irish Parliamentary Assembly 
 
While IGR in the UK, post-devolution has, as its formal face, the Joint Ministerial Council, 
there is no such body for IPR and the closest one comes to such a beast is the British-Irish 
Parliamentary Assembly (BIPA).11  First established in 1990 as the British-Irish 
Parliamentary Body, BIPA is rooted in the peace process and the longstanding attempts to re-
establish devolution, on a power-sharing model, in Northern Ireland and indeed the principal 
of such a body received support from the UK and Irish Governments when the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement was signed in 1985.12 Initially consisting of 50 Members, 25 from each 
parliament, New Labour’s devolution programme and the Good Friday Agreement, saw the 
body expanded, in 2001, to include representatives from the legislatures of the member 
jurisdictions of the British-Irish Council (UK, the Republic of Ireland, the devolved 
governments of Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales and the Crown Dependencies of 
Guernsey, Jersey and the Isle of Man).13 In 2008, the body was renamed the British-Irish 
Parliamentary Assembly. 
 
BIPA, as with other inter-parliamentary assemblies such as the NATO Parliamentary 
Assembly and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, meets in plenary and 
committee formats. BIPA meets in plenary mode twice a year with responsibility for hosting 
the sessions alternating between Ireland (which normally hosts the spring session) and the 
UK (which generally hosts the autumn sessions). At these sessions it is customary for a 
minister from the host government to address BIPA, ‘outlining government priorities relevant 
to the work of the body’ and answer questions from members, these sessions also include 
debates on and consideration of the reports produced by BIPA’s committees.14 
 
                                                          
11 A point highlighted by the House of Commons Justice Committee in its 2009 report, Devolution: a 
decade on (paras. 121 and 124) 
12 J. Coakley, ‘British Irish Institutional Structures: Towards a New Relationship’, Irish Political 
Studies, 29 (1) (2014), pp.76-97 
13 There are five members from each of the devolved legislatures and one each from the legislatures of 
the three Crown Dependencies. 
14 Coakley, ‘British Irish Institutional Structures’, p.84 
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BIPA currently boasts four committees which undertake the more ‘day to day’ work of the 
assembly: committee A – sovereign matters; committee B – European affairs; committee C – 
economic; committee D – (environment and social). Aside from committee A, whose 
membership is restricted to members from the two ‘sovereign parliaments’, the committees 
draw on members from across the assembly.  
 
BIPA has no legislative role and is a purely advisory body. Seen by some as perhaps 
‘worthy but dull’ (as Coakley explains, ‘early assessments of the British Irish Parliamentary 
body judged it to be a useful but unexciting initiative’), BIPA’s main functions are 
informational (as seen in the Q and A sessions with government ministers in its plenary 
format or in the work of its committees); socialisational – the assembly's declared mission ‘is 
to promote co-operation between political representatives in Britain and Ireland for the 
benefit of the people they represent’; and, anchored as it is in the peace process, symbolic.15 
As will be discussed later in this article, BIPA also plays a role in the bureaucratic-officials 
level of IPR.  
 
b) The speakers and presiding officers quadrilaterals 
 
Looking purely at the UK, post-devolution, PACAC has suggested that perhaps the closest 
we have come to a formal set of IPR arrangements has come at speaker and presiding officer 
level.16 In 2002, the first notable attempt was made at initiating a speaker/presiding officer 
dialogue when the then Speaker of the Northern Ireland Assembly, Lord Alderdice (John 
Alderdice) organised a conference of the speakers, presiding officers, and clerks of the UK, 
Ireland, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands. In more recent years, a system of regular 
meetings between the speakers and presiding Officers of the four UK legislatures has 
emerged.  
 
These meetings are not strictly formal, in the sense that they are underpinned by 
resolutions of each chamber (as we shall see, the power of the Welsh Affairs Committee to 
meet with committees of the National Assembly for Wales can be found in the standing 
orders of both institutions), have a corporate identity and have fixed meetings. These 
                                                          
15 Ibid., p.85 
16 Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Inter-institutional relations in the UK, 
para.82 
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meetings take place on a, relatively, regular basis, but are dependent on a mixture of routine 
and goodwill. At best, they can be described as a semi-formal feature of IPR.   
  
Little is known about the content, agenda and outcomes of these meetings with the 
level of transparency of the speakers and presiding officers quadrilaterals criticised as 
‘unsatisfactory’ in PACAC’s 2017 report. The committee recommended that the speakers and 
presiding officers ‘consider providing written notice, and written summaries, of these 
quadrilaterals’. Until such a point, we may have to rely on the evidence of a former Presiding 
Officer of the National Assembly for Wales, Dame Rosemary Butler, who told PACAC that 
the quadrilaterals had proven ‘valuable, particularly in providing opportunities for knowledge 
exchange’. 17 
 
Committee-committee level 
 
While BIPA and the quadrilaterals demonstrate that there are examples of parliament-
parliament IPR, the real engine room of intra-UK IPR, post-devolution, has been at the 
committee-committee and official-official levels. The importance of the latter was 
appreciated by Winetrobe in his 2002 survey of IPR (and will be discussed in the next 
section), however the committee-committee level has been less examined. This is despite the 
fact that committees have played a valuable, and growing, role in strengthening relations 
between parliamentarians in the different UK legislatures.   
 
The Welsh Affairs Committee and the National Assembly for Wales 
 
Arguably the only example of an entrenched platform for IPR comes in the form of the 
powers granted for the Welsh Affairs Committee (WAC) and committees of the National 
Assembly for Wales (NAfW) to hold joint evidence sessions - a power that is enshrined in the 
standing orders of both institutions.18   
 
                                                          
17 Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Inter-institutional relations in the UK, 
para. 97 
18 See: House of Commons, Standing Orders – Public Business (2017), Standing Order No. 137A(3); 
and the National Assembly for Wales, Assembly Business: Standing Orders of the National Assembly 
for Wales (October 2017), Standing Order No. 17.54. However, unlike the provisions of Standing 
Order No. 137A(3), the Assembly’s standing order states that “Committees may meet concurrently 
with any committee or joint committee  of any legislature in the UK” (Standing Order No. 17.54). 
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This power resulted from the peculiarities of the devolution dispensation provided for 
Wales by the 1998 Government of Wales Act. Unlike the law-making bodies created in 
Scotland and Northern Ireland, the National Assembly for Wales (NAfW) was created as a 
body corporate invested with a model of executive devolution that saw most of the functions 
exercised previously by the Secretary of State for Wales and the Welsh Office transferred to 
the NAfW. The NAfW was thus empowered with a range of secondary legislative powers in 
policy fields such as agriculture, education and health, while primary law-making powers in 
those fields (and others) remained reserved at Westminster.19 The result was a ‘jagged edge’ 
of the devolution boundary, and a strong degree of policy and legislative inter-dependency, 
between Westminster and the NAfW.20 
   
By 2003, these dynamics had resulted in increasing frustration at the level of 
duplication of scrutiny work undertaken by WAC and Committees of the NAfW. This 
‘significant overlap of work’ was particularly felt in relation to the draft National Health 
Service (Wales) Bill, legislation that was the subject of pre-legislative scrutiny by both WAC 
and the Assembly’s Health and Social Services Committee and prompted WAC to 
recommend that powers be granted for formal joint meetings to take place between itself and 
NAfW committees.21 Following this recommendation, and the government’s response that 
‘joint pre-legislative scrutiny by the WAC and the appropriate Committee of NAfW would be 
helpful’, officials in both institutions established a working group to see how WAC’s 
proposals could be progressed.22  
 
The findings of the joint working group were appended to the Procedure Committee’s 
2003 report Joint Activities with the National Assembly for Wales, the main proposal being 
‘reciprocal enlargement’ that ‘would allow the National Assembly and the Welsh Grand, and 
Assembly and House of Commons committees, to invite members of the other institution to 
participate in their debate or evidence sessions. The ‘host’ institution would continue to apply 
                                                          
19 R. Rawlings, Delineating Wales: Constitutional, Legal and Administrative Aspects of National 
Devolution, (Cardiff, 2003), pp.5-6 
20 R. Wyn Jones and R. Scully, Wales Says Yes: Devolution and the 2011 Welsh Referendum, 
(Cardiff, 2011), pp.39-56; Rawlings, Delineating Wales, pp.62-70 
21 Procedure Committee, Joint Activities with the National Assembly for Wales, Third Report of 
Session 2003-04 (2004), HC 582, para. 2 
22 Welsh Affairs Committee, The Government Response to the Fourth Report of the Committee: The 
Primary Legislative Process as its affects Wales, Third Special Report of Session 2002-03 (2003), HC 
989; Welsh Affairs Committee, The Primary Legislative Process as it affects Wales, Fourth Report of 
Session 2002-03 (2003), HC 79, paras. 39-41 
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its standard practices and procedures, subject to any small adjustments to reflect 
enlargement’.23 In turn, the Procedure Committee proposed that: 
a) Until the end of the current parliament, the Welsh Affairs Committee should be 
authorised to invite members of any specified committee of the National Assembly 
for Wales to attend and participate in its proceedings (but not to vote), subject to a 
quorum of both committees being present;  
b) During such proceedings, use of the Welsh language should be allowed in all 
circumstances, with the National Assembly providing interpreters and transcription of 
Welsh language contributions.24 
 
On 28 May 2004, a little after a fortnight after the publication of the Procedure Committee’s 
response, the Welsh Affairs Committee and the Economic Development and Transport 
Committee of the National Assembly for Wales published a joint press notice announcing 
that that they intended, subject to the approval of both legislatures, to hold joint meetings as 
part of their pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Transport (Wales) Bill.25 Approval was 
forthcoming in Parliament and the National Assembly on 7 June and 15 June 2004 
respectively and the two Committees met jointly in the National Assembly on 21 June and in 
Westminster on 23 and 24 June 2004.26  
 
In its report on the draft bill, the Welsh Affairs Committee praised the ‘reciprocal 
enlargement’ experiment, describing the meetings between the two committees as 
demonstrating ‘an innovative and progressive approach to pre-legislative scrutiny’ that 
enabled the committees to avoid “the unnecessary duplication of evidence that marked 
scrutiny of previous ‘“Wales-only” draft Bills’.27  
 
On the back of this successful experiment, the House of Commons, on 15 July 2005, voted to 
amend its Standing Orders so that joint working could be a permanent tool at the disposal of 
                                                          
23 Procedure Committee, Joint Activities with the National Assembly for Wales, para.9 
24 Ibid., para. 12 
25 Welsh Affairs Committee and Economic Development and Transport Committee, Joint Press 
Notice: Pre-legislative scrutiny, the draft Transport (Wales) Bill [online] (28 May 2004), 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-archive/welsh-affairs-committee/welsh-
affairs-and-economic-development-and-transport-committees-press-notice-n0-1-03-04-/ (accessed 
online: 10/01/2018)   
26 Welsh Affairs Committee, Draft Transport (Wales) Bill, Fourth Report of Session 2003-04 (2004), 
HC 759, paras. 5-6 
27 Ibid., para. 8 
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the Welsh Affairs Committee and the committees of the National Assembly for Wales.28 
Enshrining the concept of ‘reciprocal enlargement’, the standing orders state that: ‘the Welsh 
Affairs Committee may invite members of any specified committee of the National Assembly 
for Wales to attend and participate in its proceedings (but not to vote)’.29  
 
Since then, the Welsh Affairs Committee has used its formal powers to meet jointly 
with a Committee of the National Assembly on a number of occasions. The most recent of 
this feature was a joint evidence session in Cardiff with the Assembly’s Constitutional and 
Legislative Affairs Committee on 9 November 2015 as part of their respective pre-legislative 
scrutiny of the draft Wales Bill.30 Joint sessions have, when they have taken place, been 
positively regarded (at least by WAC) and while the number of joint sessions has been in the 
single digits, there would likely have been greater scope for such meetings had it not been for 
the handling of the LCO-referral process.31  
 
As a result of the issues caused by a process that often saw LCOs ‘referred to 
Assembly committees for scrutiny months before they arrived in Parliament’, and the with 
the exception of a joint evidence session held with the Assembly’s Proposed Domiciliary 
Care Legislative Competence Order (LCO) Committee, on 17 January 2007, IPR between the 
WAC and NAfW was dominated by informal collaboration.32 Such informal collaboration 
proved to be arguably more extensive in scope than the more formal and public IPR offered 
by joint sessions. As the WAC explained in its 2010 report, Review of the LCO Process, in 
each of the draft LCOs that were scrutinised by the committee in that parliamentary session, 
‘our Chairman has held an informal meeting with the Chair of the Assembly Committee, 
either in person or via video-link, and in some cases we have held informal joint meetings 
open to all the members of both committees’.33  
 
The Scottish Affairs Committee and the Scottish Parliament  
                                                          
28 House of Commons, The Journals of the House of Commons, Volume 262 (11 May 2005 – 8 
November 2006), p.127 
29 House of Commons, Standing Orders: Public Business, Standing Order No. 137A(3) 
30 Welsh Affairs Committee, Pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Wales Bill, First Report of Session 
2015-16, HC 449 (2016), para. 11 
31 S. Griffiths and P. Evans, ‘Constitution by Committee? Legislative Competence Orders under the 
Government of Wales Act (2007-2011)’, Parliamentary Affairs, 66 (2013), 495 
32 Welsh Affairs Committee, Review of the LCO process, Fifth Report of Session 2009-10 (2010), HC 
155, paras. 58-66; Griffiths and Evans, ‘Constitution by Committee?’, p.495 
33 Welsh Affairs Committee, Review of the LCO process, para. 63 
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While the narrow confines of Standing Order 137A (3) may have made sense during the 
operation of the first two Welsh devolution dispensations (namely the Government of Wales 
Act 1998 and the provisions of Part 3 Schedule 5 of the Government of Wales Act 2006), 
when there was a considerable cross-cutting of administrative and legislative responsibility 
between Westminster and Cardiff Bay, it seems increasingly difficult to defend. In recent 
years there has been a growing number of concurrent policy fields across the territorial 
constitution, most notably in Scotland where, as a result of the Scotland Acts 2012 and 2016, 
the fields of fiscal and welfare policies are now shared between the UK and Scottish 
Governments. As PACAC noted in its 2017 report that recommended expanding the 
provisions of Standing Order 137A (3) to all committees of the House, ‘it makes little sense, 
given the increasing number of concurrent responsibilities, for 137A (3) to continue to be 
limited to the Welsh Affairs Committee’.34   
 
To demonstrate this point, in March 2017 the Scottish Affairs Committee (SAC) and 
the Scottish Parliament’s Social Security Committee (SSC) held two ‘joint meetings’, in 
Holyrood on 13 March and in Westminster on 20 March, examining ‘how the Scottish and 
UK governments are co-operating to ensure a smooth transition of the newly devolved 
powers, in particular the effectiveness of the Joint Ministerial Working Group’.35 In both 
cases, the standing orders of the respective legislatures meant that a measure of procedural 
creativity had to be deployed to facilitate joint working.  
As a result, the members of the visiting committee in each session were technically listed as 
witnesses, though in practice the sessions ran on the principle of ‘reciprocal enlargement’.36 
The convenor of the SSC explained this arrangement in her introductory remarks on the 13 
March: 
This is technically a meeting of the Social Security Committee, but in practice it is a 
historic joint meeting — it is the very first meeting of our two committees together. 
                                                          
34 Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Inter-institutional relations in the UK, 
para. 96 
35 Scottish Affairs Committee, ‘Ministers appear before joint sitting of Holyrood and Westminster 
Committees’ [online] (20 March 2017), https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-
a-z/commons-select/scottish-affairs-committee/news-parliament-2015/social-security-sos-evidence-
16-17/ (accessed 12/01/2018)  
36 See: Scottish Affairs Committee, ‘Oral evidence: Inter-governmental cooperation on social 
security’ (20 March 2017), HC 1095; Scottish Parliament, ‘Official Report: Social Security 
Committee’, Session 5 (13 March 2017) 
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For technical reasons, members of Parliament are listed in the agenda as witnesses, 
but I will treat MPs and members of the Scottish Parliament equally as members of 
the committee. I hope that questions from MPs and MSPs flow smoothly.37 38 
Following these sessions, the two committees agreed to the publication of a joint letter, 
signed by both Chairs, addressed to the then Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, the Rt 
Hon Damien Green MP, and the Scottish Government’s Cabinet Secretary for Communities, 
Social Security and Equalities, Angela Constance MSP. The letter, signed by both chairs, 
effectively acted in lieu of the standard report published by committees at the end of an 
inquiry, setting out the committees’ key findings ‘and suggestions for further strengthening 
inter-governmental relations and the security thereof’.39   
 
It is too early to say whether the two ‘joint sessions’ will become a repeat, albeit for 
logistical reasons infrequent, fixture of the Scottish Affairs Committee’s and Scottish 
parliament’s scrutiny of the new sphere of concurrent policy responsibilities created by the 
Scotland Act 2016. Nonetheless, it represents the germ of a potentially significant extension 
of IPR cooperation that could see IPR become a vehicle for scrutiny of IGR at a time when 
the scale of the latter, already made more significant by the earlier mentioned expansion of 
concurrent policy responsibilities in recent devolution legislation, will become even more 
significant as a result of Brexit.  
 
The Inter-parliamentary forum on Brexit 
The devolution dispensations were framed in the context of the UK’s membership of the 
European Union and thus by EU regulations, law and common frameworks and policy 
programmes with the devolution statutes expressly prohibiting the devolved institutions from 
legislating contrary to EU law.40 As a result, in a number of policy areas, competencies which 
are devolved are, in effect, also ‘occupied’, to varying degrees, by the EU, e.g. in agriculture 
where the devolved governments have to implement the Common Agricultural Policy.  
                                                          
37 Sandra White MSP, in, Scottish Parliament, Official Report: Social Security Committee, Session 5, 
(13 March 2017), col. 1  
38 Pete Wishart MP and Sandra White MSP, ‘Joint Letters to Rt Hon Damien Green MP and Angela 
Constance MSP (10 April 2017), 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmscotaf/Joint-Letter-to-Rt-Hon-Damian-
Green-MP.PDF / https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmscotaf/Joint-
Letter-to-Angela-Constance-MSP.PDF  
 
40 Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Inter-institutional relations in the UK, 
para. 8 
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As Armstrong has noted, repatriation of policy competencies from the EU back to the 
UK ‘will also mean that the devolved governments will also acquire new task and 
responsibilities’.41 The scope and scale of these new competencies have been the subject of 
intense debate, not least in light of clause 11 of the EU Withdrawal Bill which, if passed and 
enacted, would replace the current restriction on devolved institutions to legislate contrary to 
EU law with a restriction on legislating contrary to ‘retained EU law’ .42 However, it looks 
likely that at least one of the consequences will be a further increase in the policy fields 
where responsibility is held concurrently, between the UK government and the devolved 
administrations, and the creation of a number of common frameworks top regulate these 
shared policy fields.  
 
In October 2017, the JMC (European Negotiations) agreed the following principles that 
should underpin any common frameworks: 
1. Common frameworks will be established where they are necessary in order to: 
 enable the functioning of the UK internal market, while acknowledging policy 
divergence; 
 ensure compliance with international obligations; 
 ensure the UK can negotiate, enter into and implement new trade agreements and 
international treaties; 
 enable the management of common resources; 
 administer and provide access to justice in cases with a cross-border element; 
 safeguard the security of the UK. 
2. Frameworks will respect the devolution settlements and the democratic accountability 
of the devolved legislatures, and will therefore: 
 be based on established conventions and practices, including that the competence 
of the devolved institutions will not normally be adjusted without their consent; 
 maintain, as a minimum, equivalent flexibility for tailoring policies to the specific 
needs of each territory as is afforded by current EU rules; 
                                                          
41 K. Armstrong, Brexit Tim: Leaving the EU – Why, How and When?, (Cambridge, 2017), p.186 
42 See: Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Devolution and Exiting the EU 
and Clause 11 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill: Issues for Consideration, First Report of 
Session 2017-19 (2017), HC 484 
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 lead to a significant increase in decision-making powers for the devolved 
administrations. 
3. Frameworks will ensure recognition of the economic and social linkages between 
Northern Ireland and Ireland and that Northern Ireland will be the only part of the UK 
that shares a land frontier with the EU. They will also adhere to the Belfast 
Agreement.43 
 
There are already signs that the UK’s legislatures are alert to the need to strengthen IPR in 
advance of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. In its 2017 report Brexit: devolution, the 
House of Lords European Union Committee recommended that ‘the structures for inter-
parliamentary dialogue and cooperation be strengthened’ both over the short and longer 
term.44 With regards to the former, the committee suggested that it would build on the model 
of its ‘well-established mechanisms for collaboration with our colleagues in the devolved 
legislatures’, in particular the ECUK forum (a forum comprising of the chairs of the 
committees in the four UK legislatures with responsibility for EU affairs and which meets 
twice a year).45 As such, the committee indicated that ‘working in conjunction with other 
Committees of the House […] [it would] propose more regular joint meetings with members 
of cognate Committees with responsibility for Brexit-related issues in the Scottish 
Parliament, National Assembly for Wales and Northern Ireland Assembly, and in the House 
of Commons, for the duration of the Brexit negotiations’ – in essence an enlarged ECUK.46  
 
As a result of this report, on 12 October 2017 the ‘Interparliamentary forum on 
Brexit’ was convened in the House of Lords for its inaugural meeting. Chaired by the Senior 
Deputy Speaker of the House of Lords, Lord John McFall, the attendees included 
representatives from committees in both Houses of Parliament, the Scottish parliament and 
the National Assembly for Wales, while officials were sent from the Northern Ireland 
                                                          
43 HM Government, Joint Ministerial Committee (EU Negotiations) Communique 16 October 2017, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/652285/Joint_Ministeri
al_Committee_communique.pdf (accessed online: 01/11/2017) 
44 European Union Committee, Brexit: devolution, Fourth Report of Session 2017-19 (2017), HL 
Paper 9, pp. 297-298 
45 Ibid., pp. 289 and 297 
46 With regards to the longer term options for IPR, the Lords European Union Committee contended 
that “a strengthened forum for interparliamentary dialogue” would be needed within the post-Brexit 
United Kingdom. However, the Committee acknowledged that the precise form and resourcing of this 
body, and its relationship with other IPR forums, would be a matter for future consideration 
(European Union Committee, Brexit: devolution, para. 298). 
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Assembly.47  According to the joint statement released following the meeting, attendees 
discussed the work that each of the respective committees and legislatures had been 
undertaking in their scrutiny of the Brexit process and how best they could ‘work together in 
the months to come as the Brexit process moves forward’. The attendees also indicated that 
they would meet again at regular intervals in 2018 ‘to work together as parliamentarians to 
review the progress of both the negotiations and the parallel domestic legislation’.48  
 
c) Official-official level  
 
So far, this discussion has focused on the political, parliamentarian level of IPR in the UK, 
post-devolution. However, as PACAC identified in its 2017 report on Inter-institutional 
relations, a significant amount of inter-parliamentary interactions take place between the 
officials and staff of the four UK legislatures.49 It is also worth noting that official-official 
level engagement cuts across parliament-parliament and committee-committee levels of IPR. 
For example, in the case of BIPA, its secretariat is drawn from staff from both the UK and 
Irish Parliaments.  This not only sees a British and an Irish official sharing the post of joint 
Clerk of BIPA, but also results in each of BIPAs committees being staffed by a clerk and a 
shadow clerk drawn from either parliament.50   
 
As with other forms of IPR, official-official level IPR can vary considerably between 
semi-formalised networks which meet annually and where papers are provided and more 
informal, ad-hoc arrangements. The following are examples of the former model of official-
official IPR. 
 
UK, Irish and Islands clerks’ seminar 
Believed to have begun in 2005, this annual seminar brings together clerks from across the 
four UK legislatures, the Oireachtas and the legislatures of Jersey and the Isle of Man. The 
                                                          
47 European Union Committee, ‘Interparliamentary Forum on Brexit holds first meeting’ [online] (13 
October 2017), https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/eu-
select-committee-/news-parliament-2017/first-interparliamentary-brexit-forum/ (accessed online: 
15/01/2018)  
48 Ibid. 
49 Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Inter-institutional relations in the UK, 
para. 81 and 98 
50 For an example of how BIPA’s staffing situation works in practice, see: British-Irish Parliamentary 
Assembly, ‘Nineteenth Annual Report’ (February 2015), pp.24, 37 
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seminar is held in a different territory each year and serves primarily as a socialisational and 
informational forum, providing an opportunity for clerks ‘to discuss matters of mutual 
interest, to share best practice and to develop professional networks’.51  At the most recent 
seminar, held in Dublin on 28 and 29 September 2017, topics for discussion included the 
impact of Brexit on the respective legislatures, parliamentary engagement in a digital age and 
the impact of confidence and supply arrangements on parliaments.52 
 
Committee Secretariat Network  
A similar body to the UK, Irish and Islands Clerks seminar, the Committee Secretariat 
Network is an informal network that brings together committee staff from across the UK 
(including the London Assembly), the Republic of Ireland and the Crown Dependencies. The 
network meets either once or twice a year, again responsibility for hosting the network rotates 
among the member bodies. As with the seminar, the network conferences ‘provide an 
opportunity to discuss matters of mutual interest, to share best practice and to develop 
professional networks’.53  At the 2017 CSN meeting in Cardiff, agenda items included youth 
engagement by parliaments and the role of Public Accounts Committees in the different 
jurisdictions.54  
 
The Inter-Parliamentary Research and Information Network (IPRIN) 
 
IPRIN acts as a forum for parliamentary research and information staff to meet and exchange 
ideas and information with the aim of developing and enhancing the ‘efficiency, effectiveness 
and quality of Members’ services’. IPRIN facilitates this interaction through an annual 
conference, hosted on a rotational basis by the member legislatures, and an online forum. 
IPRIN’s membership is drawn from the House of Commons Library, the House of Lords 
Library, the National Assembly for Wales Research Service, the Northern Ireland Assembly 
                                                          
51 The agendas and other papers of these meetings are published online on the website of the Tynwald 
(Tynwald, External activities [online], http://www.tynwald.org.im/about/extact/Pages/default.aspx  
(accessed 16/01/2018)) 
52 Agenda: The UK, Irish and Islands Clerks’ Seminar – 28th and 29th September 2017, 
http://www.tynwald.org.im/about/extact/clerksem/Documents/20170928Ag.pdf (accessed 06/03/18) 
53 Again, the papers of these meetings are published online on the Tynwald website.  
54 Agenda: Committee Secretariat Network Meeting – 2017, 
http://www.tynwald.org.im/about/extact/csn/Documents/2017CaAg.pdf (accessed 06/03/18)  
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Research and Information Service, the Oireachtas Library and Research Service, the Scottish 
Parliament Information Centre and the Tynwald Information Service.55  
 
In addition to the above listed examples, there are other, less publicised, interactions 
between officials.56 The author is aware of engagement at clerks level, replicating that of the 
speakers and presiding officers quadrilaterals, an informal network of officials from 
secondary legislation scrutiny committees across the UK and, rather appositely, collaboration 
between those responsible for public engagement and outreach activities of the four UK 
legislatures. What these engagements have in common, along with IPR more generally is 
their informal nature, their reliance on continued goodwill between the actors concerned and, 
in a number of cases, the sense that such collaboration represents good practice.57 
 
Conclusions: IPR in the UK – what’s happened and what’s next? 
Inter-parliamentary relations (IPR) has been an oft-overlooked and, generally, understudied 
aspect of the territorial constitution, post-devolution. To the extent that IPR has been 
commented on, except for Winetrobe’s more detailed analysis in 2002, it has been to suggest 
that more should be done and/or that IPR is under-developed, particularly in comparison to 
intergovernmental relations (IGR). Certainly, IPR does not have the same level of 
development as IGR when it comes to formal institutions. For example, despite the 
recommendations of the House of Commons Justice Committee in 2009 and the Strathclyde 
Commission in 2014, there is no institution that brings together the four UK legislatures in 
the way that the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC) does for the four governments.58 
However, as this article has identified IPR in the UK are far more extensive and dynamic 
than has previously been appreciated. While there may be no intra-UK equivalent of the 
JMC, representatives from the four UK legislatures meet formally as part of the British-Irish 
Parliamentary Assembly, while another example of parliament-parliament level cooperation 
                                                          
55 See: The Inter-Parliamentary Research and Information Network, https://iprinblog.wordpress.com/   
56 See: Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Inter-institutional relations in the 
UK, para. 98 
57 PACAC found in its 2017 report on Inter-institutional relations in the UK that there was much 
goodwill for IPR engagement and that “the principle of closer inter-parliamentary cooperation 
commands much support”. Although it also noted that there was “no consensus on any particular 
model of enhanced inter-parliamentary relations” (Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs 
Committee, Inter-institutional relations in the UK, para. 94).  
58 Scottish Conservatives, Commission on the Future Governance of Scotland, (May 2014), p.2; 
Justice Committee, Devolution: a decade on, paras. 121-124. 
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can be seen in the regular quadrilateral meetings of the speakers and presiding officers of the 
four legislatures. While not a formal structure like BIPA, the quad can be seen as a semi-
formal example of IPR. 
 
Indeed, once one scratches under the surface, one can find a number of examples of 
semi-formal IPR. This is particularly the case at official-official level. In Winetrobe’s 2002 
analysis it was clear that the bulk of sustained IPR activity took place between the officials of 
the four legislatures.  Official to official interactions remain an integral component of IPR in 
the UK, post-devolution and a number of semi-formalised networks exist between clerks, 
committee staff and the research and information personnel of the UK’s parliaments. 
Alongside these networks, there is also a regular stream and more informal, bilateral 
engagements at official-official level, whether in the form of secondments or even at the level 
of clerks or committee staff contacting their counterparts elsewhere in the UK to discuss 
issues of common interest.  
 
One of the biggest developments in the relative expansion of IPR in recent years has 
been at the committee-committee level. In 2004, the UK Parliament and the National 
Assembly for Wales amended their respective Standing Orders to enable the Welsh Affairs 
Committee (WAC) and committees from the National Assembly to hold joint evidence 
sessions. This innovation may have only been used a handful of times, the most recent 
occasion being in 2015, but it has played a useful role in strengthening WAC’s relationship 
with its counterparts in Cardiff Bay. Indeed, it is notable that when logistical barriers 
inhibited joint working between the WAC and Assembly committees during their respective 
scrutiny of LCOs, there was nonetheless a sustained programme of extensive, informal 
consultation and cooperation between WAC and Cardiff Bay. 
 
The value of joint sessions or enhanced cooperation between committees appears to 
have been recognised beyond the confines of Welsh devolution. In 2017, the Public 
Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee (PACAC) called for the Standing Order 
(SO No. 137A(3)) that enabled WAC to hold joint sessions to be extended to all committees, 
a recommendation that appeared to be vindicated by the evidence sessions held between 
Scottish Affairs Committee (SAC) and the Scottish Parliament’s Social Security Committee 
(SSC) to scrutinise the UK and Scottish Government’s implementation of the partial 
devolution of welfare powers provided in the Scotland Act 2016.  Thanks to some fleetness 
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of foot, these evidence sessions were able to effectively function as joint sessions despite 
neither committee having the formal power to hold such a meeting. Finally, the most recent 
example of committee-committee IPR has been the establishment of an Interparliamentary 
Forum on Brexit, bringing together committees from all four Parliaments. 
 
All of these developments in committee-committee IPR have been driven, to varying 
degrees, by concurrent policy responsibilities. In the case of the WAC and NAfW’s 
committees, cooperation was a response to the complex interdependencies of the Welsh 
devolution dispensations provided by the Government of Wales Acts 1998 and 2006. The 
former resulted in a carve-up of responsibilities that saw the NAfW provided with 
administrative devolution in fields such as education and health and the UK parliament 
retaining primary legislative powers over those areas, while the latter resulted in a two-stage 
process to the NAfW gaining primary legislative powers that saw the assembly having to 
seek legislative competence on a case by case basis from parliament during stage one (2007-
2011).  
 
Since then, the Scotland Acts 2012 and 2016 have resulted in significant aspects of 
taxation and social security policy are shared between the Holyrood and Westminster. As was 
the case in Wales, this has acted as a catalyst for IPR, hence the two joint evidence sessions 
between the SAC and SSC. It is likely that the scale and scope of concurrent policy 
responsibilities will only continue to increase, and significantly so, as a result of the UK’s 
withdrawal from the European Union.  
 
The UK Government has already indicated that it wishes UK common frameworks to 
be established in a number of policy areas where competencies will be domesticated post-
Brexit and, while there is considerable disagreement between the UK government and the 
devolved administrations as to how these common frameworks should be established and 
how they should operate, the JMC (EN) agreed a set of principles that should underpin any 
frameworks at its meeting in October 2017. The legislatures of the UK have also responded, 
forming the Interparliamentary Forum on Brexit as a vehicle for knowledge exchange, the 
sharing of best practice, building mutual awareness and considering how future cooperation 
should best take place as the process of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU continues to 
unfold. 
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This trend towards ever more inter-connected union, at least policy responsibility 
wise, looks set to only increase in the future and, if past precedent is anything to go by, it also 
looks set to remain a driver of IPR between the four UK legislatures.  Certainly, while this 
article has identified that IPR is more diverse and developed than has been previously 
appreciated, there remains scope for further growth and engagement. Although there are 
obvious constraints that may limit the opportunities for formalised and more frequent IPR 
activity, there are clear steps that could be taken to facilitate stronger cooperation.  For 
example, as PACAC noted in its 2017 report, the provisions of standing order 137A(3) could 
be extended to encompass all committees of the House of Commons and all the devolved 
legislatures, with corresponding action taken to eliminate procedural barriers to joint action in 
the respective devolved legislatures. Such steps would facilitate IPR ‘on demand’, enabling 
more formalised, and transparent, joint working in a way that works for the committees in 
question.59  
 
Other steps could include extending the potential scope for bilateral, informal contacts 
by providing devolved parliamentarians with UK parliamentary passes and vice-versa. While 
such a step would not be without its difficulties and could encounter resistance within and 
beyond Westminster, it is worth recalling that, between 1989 and 2009, UK MEPs were able 
to have parliamentary passes providing access to certain areas of both the House of Commons 
and House of Lords (since 2009 this has been limited to the House of Lords).  
 
Finally, the four UK legislatures could do more to enhance the transparency of IPR. IPR, with 
few exceptions, generally takes place behind closed doors, away from the public gaze and 
with little attempt to publicise the fact that these exchanges took place, let alone their 
outcomes. The closed nature of IPR activity in and of itself is understandable and is necessary 
to building relationships of mutual trust and confidence. However, there is scope for greater 
openness and transparency. For example, the speakers and presiding officers quadrilaterals 
are occasionally accompanied by press notices, yet, as PACAC highlighted, the agendas and 
conclusions of these meetings are shrouded in secrecy. One simple step forward, proposed by 
the committee, could be for the speakers and presiding officers to provide written notice, and 
                                                          
59 Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Inter-institutional relations in the UK, 
para. 96 
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written summaries, of the quadrilateral meetings.60 IPR in the UK, post-devolution has come 
a long way since 2002 and particularly over the course of the past decade and while there is 
much more that could be done to develop these exchanges, the four UK legislatures could do 
much more to showcase their cooperation.  
 
Notes on contributor 
Dr Adam Evans is an Honorary Research Fellow at the Wales Governance Centre at Cardiff 
University and a Senior Clerk in the House of Commons. He has published widely on aspects 
of devolution and constitutional history.  
 
                                                          
60 Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Inter-institutional relations in the UK, 
para. 97 
